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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT E. SIMMONS, CHARRIE 
BRENN AN,DA VIDA. WILLIAMS, 
LOUIE A. SHORT, PATRICIA L. 
CASTILLO, BETH L. HURST, and 
JAY EZRA REA, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This case involves the legality of the action of the 
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of 
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah 
when he issued an order to the Respondents requiring 
1 
them, individually, to a security bond or, in the 
alternative, suffer the suspension of their respective 
driver's licenses and motor vehicle registrations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-respondents substantially agree with the 
Statement of Facts as made by the defendant-appellant, 
but would point out specifically that each of the acci-
dent or damage reports submitted was a report required 
to submitted under applicable laws of the State of 
Utah. Plaintiffs-respondents object to and specifically 
point out that in Point II, Item 6, of the appellant's 
Brief (App. Br. 4), the enumeration of the six types 
of purported evidence in the records of these cases, 
specifically the of Beth L. Hurst, it is alleged 
that there was a letter from the insured motorist to 
the Cominission. No such letter was ever submitted 
in evidence to the trial court at the hearing on this 
matter. When the State first alleged that such a letter 
did exist in the file, the attorney for the plaintiffs again 
examined the file to find out if any such letter existed 
as a part of those files. As of June 19, 1969, twenty-one 
( 21 ) days after the hearing of this matter, no such 
letter had been made a part of the file of Beth L. 
Hurst. There is at the present time no such letter in 
the record on appeal before this court. Plaintiffs-re-
spondents attorney would object to any consideration of 
said letter the existence of which has never demon-
2 
strated. Accordingly, plaintiffs-respondents would 
maintain that in the consideration of this matter there 
' should be no belief that any such letter is a part of the 
facts in the Beth H. Hurst case, or is in any way an 




THE ACTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFE-
TY OF THE STATE OF UTAH ORDERING 
THE RESPONDENTS TO EITHER POST 
A SECURITY BOND OR SUFFER SUSPEN-
SION OF THEIR DRIVERS LICENSES AND 
VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS IS CONTRARY 
TO THE LAWS OF UTAH. 
Section 41-12-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
pertinent to the issues before this court, states: 
"If twenty days after the receipt of a report 
of a motor vehicle accident within this state which 
has resulted in bodily injury or death, or damage 
to the property of any one person in excess of 
$100, the commission does not have on file evi-
dence satisfactory to it that the person who 
would otherwise be required to file security under 
subsection (b) of this section has been released 
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from liability, or has been finally adjudicated 
not to be liable, or has executed a duly acknowl-
edged written agreement providing for the pay-
ment of an agreed amount in installments with 
respect to all claims for injuries or damages 
resulting from the accident, the commission shall 
determine the amount of security which shall 
he sufficient in its judgment to satisfy any judg-
ment or judgments for damages resulting from 
such accident as may be recovered against each 
operator or owner. The commission shall deter-
mine the amount of security deposit upon the 
basis of the reports or other evidence submitted 
to it but shall not require a deposit of security 
for the benefit of any person when evidence has 
not been submitted by such person or on his be-
half as to the extent of his injuries or the damage 
to his property within fifty ( 50) days fallowing 
the date of the accident." (Emphasis added) 
The specific issue involved in this case primarily in-
volves the impact of the language: 
"The commission 1 shall determine the amount 
of security deposit upon the basis of the reports 
or other evidence submitted to it but shall not 
require a deposit of security for the benefit of 
any person when evidence has not been submitted 
by such person or on his behalf as to the extent 
of his injuries or the damage to his property 
within fifty ( 50) days fallowing the date of the 
accident." (Emphasis added) 
1 "Commission" is defined in Section 41-12-l(a), Utah Code An-
notated 1953, as "The of p_ublic safet:y"_ 
in this brief shall refer to the financial respons1b1hty d1v1s10n 
of the department of public safety. 
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In the hearings below, the exhibits offered by the 
Director of the Financial Responsibility Division of 
the Department of Public Safety of the State of Utah 
to support the orders issued in each of these cases, (each 
respondent had received an order requiring in the alter-
native either the posting of a determined security bond 
or the suspension of his driver's license and motor ve-
hicle registration) were: 
1. The accident report filed by the investigating 
officer. (present in every file). 
2. The accident report filed by the insured motor-
ist. (present in every file). 
3. The accident report filed by the uninsured mo-
torist. (present in every file) . 
4. Body shop estimates of the cost of repair of 
the damages. (present in some of the files). 
5. Personal injury reports filled in by injured driv-
ers and/ or passengers which were prepared and signed 
by a physician. (present in some of the files). 
As each of these reports was offered into evidence, 
the attorneys for the plaintiffs objected that this was 
not evidence submitted by the injured party or on his 
behalf as is required by Sectoin 41-12-5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. It was submitted by the attorneys for 
the plaintiffs that this offered evidence was of a nature 
envisioned by the sta'tutes as being already before the 
Commission and the language quoted required some-
5 
thing other than reports which would be submitted 
to the Commission by the normal operation of the 
statutory scheme enacted by the Financial Responsi-
bility Laws and Motor Vehicle Code, Traffic Rules 
and Regulations. 
The accident report filed by the insured motorist and 
the accident report filed by the uninsured motorist are 
each required to be filed with the Commission by Sec-
tion 41-6-35 (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Subsection 
(b) of that statute further empowers the Commission 
to require a more complete description of the accident 
of the accident if the original report is not detailed 
enough. Not only are these comprehensive accident 
reports required of each driver within 5 days of the 
accident, but Sec'tion 41-6-36, Utah Code Annotated , 
1953, provides that should any driver be physically 
incapable of giving immediate report of accident there 
are alternative methods for that driver's report to be 
submitted. Section 41-6-35 (b), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, gives the Commission the power to require reports 
from witnesses. Subsection ( c) of Section 41-6-35, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, requires the report of the in-
vestigating offecer to be filed within twenty-four (24) 
hours of the accident. In summation, the reports of 
the investigating officer and each of the drivers must 
be filed with the Commission within five days of the 
accident and the Commission may then require addi-
tional reports from the drivers and any witnesses to 
the accident. These statutes give the Commission com-
6 
prehensive power to investigate the causes of an acci-
dent both to provide a basis for the setting of security 
and to permit the examination of the causes of the acci-
dent for accident prevention studies. 
The body shop damage estimates and personal 
injury reports were filed on forms submitted to the 
garages and doctors respectively by the Commission. 
This was done presumably pursuant to Section 41-
6-35 (b) and Section 41-6-39, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, which empowers the agency to obtain reports 
from witnesses of accidents and requires garage keepers 
to submit reports of damaged vehicles. The Commis-
sion is, thereby, given the power and authority to inves-
tigate the consequences, that is, the personal injuries 
and property damage resulting from the accident. 
Section 41-6-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, spells 
out in detail the contents of the reports and sets forth 
the penalties for failure to answer these reports. That 
section, in conjunction with Section 41-6-40, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, clarify the dual nature of the 
report program established. First, it is to allow the 
Department of Public Safety itself to carry out its 
study of accidents so as to enable it to suggest laws 
and implement aimed at accident preven· 
ti on. The second function, as is clear from Sections 
41-6-40 and 41-12-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is, 
by means of the required reports, to enable the Com-
mission to carry out its assigned task of determining 
the amount of security that must be required of any 
7 
uninsured driver not otherwise exempted from the 
requirement of posting security or suffering suspen-
sion of his driver's license and motor vehicle registra-
tion. In carrying out this function, the respondents 
would agree with the contention of the appellant ( app. 
Br. pp 3-4) that the administrative agency should 
have broad powers in making its decisions. It is clear 
that the Legislature intended to give the Commission 
broad powers of investigation to effectuate 'their as-
signed duties. 
All of this comprehensive statutory scheme for 
supplying information to the Commission had been 
established by the Legislature at the time it enacted the 
first clause of second sentence of Section 41-12-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953: 
"The commission shall determine the amount 
of security deposit upon tjie basis of the reports 
or other evidence submitted to it ... " 
However, the second clause of the sentence then goes 
on to..pr-ovide : 
" . . . but it shall not require a deposit of se-
curity for the benefit of any person when evi-
dence has not been submitted by such person or 
on his behalf as to 'the extent of his injuries or 
the damage to his property within fifty ( 50) 
days following the date of the accident." 
This language clearly reflects an intention and an obvi-
ous meaning that the evidence required before an 
requiring the depositing of security may be issued must 
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be something other than the reports required as hereto-
fore described. This additional evidence must be sub-
mitted to the Commission before that agency is em-
powered to issue an order requiring either the posting 
of security in the amount that the reports had shown 
to be necessary or the suspension of the driver's license 
and motor vehicle registration of the uninsured driver. 
The key language revealing and expressing the basis 
of thi.s requirement of additional evidence are the words: 
"for the benefit of any person." The Commission is 
not to be empowered to act until someone has acted 
for himself because the order requiring the posting of 
a security bond or suspension of driver's license and 
motor vehicle registration is envisioned as an action 
for the benefit of the injured party who was not pro-
tected by insurance. This intent and the language 
chosen to enact it clearly require that some affirmative 
act must be made by an injured party to show that he 
desires to invoke the benefits of the act. This fits logic-
ally into the whole statu'tory scheme established by the 
Financial Responsibility Laws and Motor Vehicle 
Code. 
This logic of requiring an affirmative action of one 
of is to benefit from this statute may be seen by examin-
ing other parallel provisions of the Financial Responsi-
bility Laws, Sections 41-12-13, 41-12-14, 41-12-15, 41-
12-16 and 41-12-17 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
' ' govern the situation after an injured party has secured 
a judgment against the responsible party. They provide 
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that after the action by the injured party of securing 
a judgment, he may take the additional affirmative 
action of enforcing his judgment by requiring the 
suspension of the driver's license of the judgment 
debtor who has not satisfied the judgment in addition 
to the usual methods of enforcing such a judgment. 
This action creates a right that may be asserted even 
over the bankruptcy laws of the United States of 
America. K(}.ssler v. Department of Public Safety, 
369 U.S. 153, 7 L.Ed2d 641, 82 S.Ct. 807 (1962). 
In addition to this parallel statutory scheme, there 
is the consideration of the problem of the non-liable 
( unresponsible) uninsured motorist who has been in-
volved in an accident. 2 If the Commission has the power 
to, or is required to, follow up receipt of the accident re- , 
ports with a subsequent determination of damages and 
with an order to the uninsured driver to deposit the se-
curity or suffer suspension of driving privileges without 
requiring affirmative action by the injured party, great 
injustices could be done. A responsible, but insured 
motorist is thereby empowered to compound the injury 
to, and to add to the pressure upon, the uninsured 
motorist 'to force an insufficient 1settlement because 
the State is assisting him to do so. In fact, this did 
happen in two of the cases brought in the instant matter: 
David A. Williams #195,587 and Douglas Z. Bjork-
I 
2 The issue of whether or not the Commission has the power 
to decline to issue an order where it determines that an u!l--
insured motorist is not liable is not before the Court and will 
not be pursued here. 
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man # 186,415 (not appealed) . Each of these men were 
struck by an uninsured motori.st in such a way that 
there was no question, upon examining the facts, that 
the insured motorist was the liable party.3 In each of 
these cases, the insurance company for the insured 
motorist used the order of the Commission to help 
attempt to force an unsatisfactory settlement on the 
uninsured motorist. In each case, they ref used to give 
releases of liability until such time as a final settlement 
was made. As a result, but for the action of Judge 
Croft in this matter, each of these innocent but un-
insured parties would have lost their driver's license 
in addition to the burden of the accident. Such an unfair 
result could not be intended by the legislature. 
Examination of these facts indicates that contrary 
to the proposition of the appellant (App. Br. pp. 7-9), 
the action of the Commission under the construction of 
Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
pounded by the State, would, in fact effectuate injus-
tice. This is accentuated when one contemplates the con-
sequences of requiring the affirmative act of submitting 
affirmative evidence before the Commission is empow-
ered to issue an appropriate order. If an insured driver 
were to go to the Commission and submit proof of his 
injuries when he was the party really responsible for the 
accident and its consequences, he would open himself to 
additional liability for the economic loss to the uninsured 
3 Williams was struck by a driver who ran a red light and 
Bjorkman was struck by a driver making an illegal left turn. 
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party for that party's loss of his driving privileges in 
addition to liability for the personal injury and the 
property damages. 
In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Croft stated 
clearly that this statute meant what it said. In pages 
6-8 of his Memorandum Decision, he stated: 
" ... However_, the statute clearly provides 
that even when such determination is made, the 
Commission shall not require a deposit of secur-
ity for the benefit of any person when evidence 
has not been submitted by such person or on , 
his behalf as to the extent of his injuries or the 
damage to his property within 50 days following 
the date of the accident." 
"Under Section 41-12-5 (b) the suspension 
lies only if the driver or owner fails to deposit 
the security required to be filed in the sum so 
determined by the Commission. Since, as set 
forth in the preceding paragraph, the deposit of 
security shall not be required by the Commission 
unless evidence has been submitted within the 
50 day period by the injured person or on his 
behalf, it seems clear to me that the suspension 
will not lie until such evidence is submitted with-
in the 50 day period." 
"This requires, in my opinion, something more 
than the filing by the injured person of the Sec-
tion 41-6-35 report, for that report must be 
filed within five days, and if that was all that 
was intended by the legislature to be filed by 
the injured party, no further evidence would be 
required within the 50 day period. The statutes 
relating to this five-day report do not require 
the setting forth of information from which the 
12 
Commission is to determine the amount of se-
curity to be filed by another driver." 
" ... it seems to me that by the evidence-
within-50-days requirement, the legislature in-
tended that if the injured party intended to hold 
the other driver responsible for injuries or dam-
age, such injured party must make some affirma-
tive showing that he so intended by coming for-
ward and filing with the department evidence 
as to the extent of his injuries, and that it was 
not the legislative intent that, absent such filing 
by or on behalf of the injured party, the Com-
mission could or should go head and collect such 
evidence on its own initiative. It would do well, 
instead, to advise the respective drivers of the 
50-day filing requirement." 
"Even if an injured party concluded within 
60 days after the accident that his own fault 
caused the accident, all of the reports and infor-
mation collected by the Commission would be 
on hand from which a determination of damage 
might be made. To then say that even though 
the injured party did not intend to seek recovery 
for his damages, the Commission can neverthe-
less require security and suspend the license, if 
not filed, seems grossly unfair." 
"The requirement of security is for the benefit 
of the injured driver, not 'the public, and to sus-
pend the license of a driver when the other party 
manifests no intent to seek recompense for his 
injury by filing evidence serves no useful or 
public purpose. 
"It is, therefore, my opinion that since, in the 
record before me, none of the other parties in-
volved in the accident filed the required evidence 
13 
within the 50 day period, no security was required 
to be filed by the plaintiffs. Their licenses were 
not subject to revocation, and the orders sus-
pending the same were invalid and contrary to 
law." 
CONCLUSION 
Section 41-12-5 (a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is very clear in its requirement that before the Com-
mission is empowered to issue an order requiring the 
posting of a bond or the suspension of drivers license 
and vehicle registration of an uninsured driver the 
affirmative action of submitting evidence of his dam-
ages is required of the driver for whose benefit such 
an order will operate. The evidence must be submitted . 
within fifty days of the accident and cannot be the , 
reports required by Sections 41-6-35, 36, 37, 39 or 40, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. No such evidence was pre-
sented to or was before the Commission when it issued 
any of the orders challenged in this action. Those orders 
were therefore, invalid, and their injunction by the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Salt Lake County Bar 
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431 South Third East 
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Attorney for Respondents 
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